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Introduction 
The right to freedom of association and the right of trade unions to bargain on 
behalf of workers are rights that have long been internationally recognised. 
This can be seen in international law instruments such as the International 
Labour Organisation's (ILO) Convention No. 87 of 1948, the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention and, under 
European law, in the shape of Article 28 of the European Union’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The right to freedom of 
association is also protected by Article 40.1.6 (iii) of the Irish Constitution. 
However, as Hogan and Whyte point out, as interpreted by the Irish Supreme 
Court, this does not imply any duty on the employer beyond respecting the 
right in itself; in particular, “it does not oblige him to negotiate with any 
association which employees may form”.1 
 
This constitutional position reflects the fact that trade union bargaining rights 
in Ireland, as in the UK, have traditionally been premised on the notion of 
“voluntarism”, i.e. the avoidance of statutory regulation.2 The position in 
Ireland remains, however, unique in the Western world in that Irish trade 
unions have no legislative right to be recognised in the workplace for 
                                               
1
 Hogan and Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th ed, 2003), p. 1803. 
2
 Kerr and Whyte, Irish Trade Union Law (1985). 
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collective bargaining purposes.3 This article considers a recent attempt, in the 
form of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-2004 (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Acts”), to address this situation. This research looked at the 
perceived effectiveness of the legislation from the point of view of the various 
employment relations stakeholders (unions, employees, employers and the 
State’s industrial relations bodies), by way of a detailed examination of the 
day-to-day operation of the Acts by the Labour Court, from their coming into 
operation in June 2001 to the immediate aftermath of the decision of the Irish 
Supreme Court in the Ryanair case,4 which, as we will see, led many 
commentators to proclaim the legislation effectively neutered.5 The article 
questions whether the Acts can, despite the pessimism of many 
commentators, still play a role in Irish industrial relations (IR).  
 
However, more broadly, the Acts represented an innovative attempt to steer a 
“half-way house” course between legally mandated collective bargaining and 
                                               
3
 Twice, in 1967 and again in 1996, groups charged with reviewing the Constitution have 
considered whether a constitutional amendment was necessary in the area of freedom of 
association. In both cases, the view expressed was that this matter would be best dealt with 
by legislation; see Report of the Committee on the Constitution (1967) and Report of the 
Constitution Review Group (1996). A statutory procedure for gaining recognition rights now 
exists in the UK; see the Employment Relations Act 1999.  
4
 Ryanair v The Labour Court [2007] 4 IR 199. 
5
 Connolly, “Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004-Implications for 
Industrial Relations Law and Practice of the Supreme Court Decision in Ryanair v Labour 
Court and IMPACT” (2007) 4 IELJ 37; Doherty, “Union Sundown? The Future of Collective 
Representation Rights in Irish Law” (2007) 4 IELJ 96. 
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voluntarism. As a result, the article will also consider some possible 
implications of the “Irish model” for IR in other European jurisdictions, 
particularly in the light of recent developments concerning collective 
bargaining rights at EU level.  
 
The article is laid out as follows. In the next section, the legislation and the 
decision in Ryanair will be outlined in more detail. Then, the methodology 
used in the analysis will be explained. The implications of the Ryanair 
decision will then be considered in light of the empirical evidence relating to 
the interpretation of the Acts. Finally, some implications of the Acts for 
industrial relations practice and collective bargaining more generally (in 
Ireland and elsewhere) will be teased out.  
 
The Industrial Relations Acts 2001-2004 
The absence of any statutory protection for collective bargaining became 
progressively more of a concern for the Irish trade union movement in the 
1990s. This was partly as the decline in union density (the proportion of 
workers who are members of a trade union) became increasingly pronounced 
and partly as a result of a change in state policy in the 1980s, where state 
industrial development agencies began “marketing” Ireland (particularly to US 
multinational corporations-MNCs) as a non-union environment.6 The unions’ 
                                               
6
 See Wallace et al, Industrial Relations in Ireland (2004); Roche, “Pay Determination, the 
State and the Politics of Industrial Relations” in Murphy and Roche (eds), Irish Industrial 
Relations in Practice (1997).  
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dissatisfaction was arguably compounded by the participation since 1987 of 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) in the social partnership process, 
which has given the union movement a key institutional role at national level 
in relation to socio-economic policy, while at workplace level unions have no 
such institutional security and must fight recalcitrant employers for recognition 
rights.  
 
As a result, the union movement pushed for progress on recognition rights for 
unions at workplace level.7 Under the fourth of the social partnership 
agreements, Partnership 2000, a high-level group comprising union and 
employer representatives and industrial relations experts was set up to 
examine the issue of trade union recognition rights.8 The result was the 
drawing up of the Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution9 and the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001. The Code of Practice and the 
2001 Act explicitly exclude the imposition of any “arrangements for collective 
bargaining”, on the grounds of protecting Ireland’s voluntarist tradition. The 
general philosophy behind both is that disputes relating to union recognition 
should be dealt with within the context of voluntary collective bargaining (with 
parties offered recourse to the advisory and conciliation services of the 
Labour Relations Commission-LRC). Thus, the 2001 Act does not provide for 
                                               
7
 Particularly in the light of a bitter and high profile 1998 union recognition dispute at the 
airline company, Ryanair. 
8
 See paragraph 9.22 of Partnership 2000. 
9
 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution) 
(Declaration) Order 2000 (S.I. No. 145 of 2000). 
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union recognition, but for a range of procedures to allow unions to seek to 
have specific disputes with regard to pay, terms and conditions of 
employment and dispute resolution procedures addressed.10  The provisions 
of the Act are used as a fallback measure whereby, in a situation where the 
parties cannot come to agreement under the “voluntary leg” of the process, a 
union or excepted body11 may request a further investigation by the Labour 
Court, which can issue a Recommendation.12 Should the issue remain 
unresolved, the Court has the power to issue a legally binding Determination 
on pay and terms of employment. If the employer does not comply with a 
Labour Court Determination, the trade union may apply to the Circuit Court for 
an order directing the employer to carry out the Determination in accordance 
with its terms.  
 
Changes to the legislation were agreed under the Sustaining Progress 
partnership agreement13 and resulted in the passing of the Industrial Relations 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004. The Act repealed S.I. No. 145 and 
                                               
10
 Ryan, “Leaving it to the Experts-In the Matter of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 
2001” (2006) 3 IELJ 118. 
11
 “Excepted body” is defined by s 6(3)(h) of the Trade Union Act 1941 (as inserted by s 2 of 
the Trade Union Act 1942) and refers to “a body all the members of which are employed by 
the same employer and which carries on negotiations for the fixing of wages or other 
conditions of employment of its own members (but no other employees)”. 
12
 Note the “Labour Court” is not part of the formal courts system but is a specially established 
industrial relations tribunal set up under the Industrial Relations Act 1946 to provide fair, 
informal and inexpensive arrangements for the adjudication and resolution of trade disputes. 
13
 See article 8.9 of Sustaining Progress. 
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replaced it with the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Enhanced Code of Practice 
on Voluntary Dispute Resolution) (Declaration) Order 2004.14 The 2004 Act 
provided that the processing of disputes under the Voluntary Dispute 
Resolution Code should take place within an indicative overall time frame of 
26 weeks, with the possibility of extending it to a maximum of 34 weeks. 
Under the Acts, therefore, an employer may be compelled to grant union 
representatives the right to represent unionised employees on workplace 
issues relating to pay and terms and conditions of employment, but cannot be 
forced to make arrangements for collective bargaining.  
 
Fasten Your Seatbelts- the Ryanair Case 
Trade unions had clearly hoped to use this legislation as a “springboard” to 
greater recognition rights,15 but such aspirations appear to have been dashed 
given the decision in Ryanair v The Labour Court.16 There, the Supreme Court 
upheld the company’s complaints against the Labour Court’s operation of the 
legislation, basing the decision on two key factors. First, the Supreme Court 
was highly critical of the procedures adopted by the Labour Court in hearing 
claims under the legislation. In particular, the Supreme Court felt that 
employees on behalf of whom claims were taken should ideally give oral 
evidence. The Court held that the Labour Court did not adopt fair procedures 
by permitting complete non-disclosure of the identity of the persons on whose 
                                               
14
 S.I. No. 176 of 2004. 
15
 Sheehan, “Employers and the Traditional Industrial Relations System: How the Bonds Have 
Been Loosened’ in Hastings (ed), The State of the Unions (2008). 
16
 [2007] 4 IR 199. Note 5, supra. 
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behalf the union was purporting to act. Furthermore, and most controversially, 
the Supreme Court criticised what it referred to as the Labour Court’s 
“mindset”, which favoured the way particular expressions are used and 
particular activities are carried out by trade unions and which hinted that 
collective bargaining in a non-unionised company must take the same form 
and adopt the same procedures as would apply in collective bargaining with a 
trade union. This is somewhat surprising, as the Superior Courts have 
traditionally been quite deferential to the Labour Court’s expertise in relation 
to industrial affairs. In the Ryanair case itself Hanna J in the High Court17 had 
endorsed this view:  
 
“The Labour Court is very much in charge of its own procedures. It has 
provided over many years a vital and invaluable service to the State in 
the often fraught area of industrial relations. It is not a court of law and 
the practice and procedure which it has evolved over the years, 
understandably, necessarily involved pursuing a less ritualistic and 
formalistic path than might be the case before these courts”. 
 
In fact, Hanna J pointed out, the present case was somewhat noteworthy in 
that lawyers did attend on behalf of the applicant. The Supreme Court’s 
criticism of the procedures adopted by the Labour Court will likely have the 
effect of encouraging a greater formality in respect of Labour Court hearings 
and perhaps encourage a further “juridificiation” of the process.18 
                                               
17
 [2006] ELR 1 at p17. 
18
 Browne, The Juridification of the Employment Relationship (1994). 
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Secondly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Labour Court had erred in law 
(due partially to this “mindset”) in its interpretation of the legislation; in 
particular, in deciding what was meant by the “practice” of “collective 
bargaining”, in assessing when “internal procedures” had been exhausted, 
and what in deciding what constituted an “excepted body”. Essentially, the 
Supreme Court was not satisfied that the Labour Court was correctly 
confirming its jurisdiction to hear claims under s 2 of the 2001 Act. As we will 
see, the number of claims processed under the 2001-2004 Acts has fallen 
dramatically in the wake of the decision.  
 
The Sample and Method 
This study looked at 103 Labour Court hearings up to, and including, the end 
of 2007, which were reported on the Labour Court website.19 Two hearings 
were reported in 2002; 10 in 2003; 20 in 2004; 31 in 2005; 31 in 2006; and 9 
in 2007. It should be noted that 89 of these hearings (86% of the total) were 
heard after the amendments introduced by the 2004 Act came into effect in 
April 2004. Eighty-nine different employers featured in the 103 hearings.20 If 
one looks at the occupational characteristics of the groups of employees 
involved in the cases, five sectors (using the Central Statistics Office 
classification)21 accounted for the bulk of the cases; “Manufacturing Industry”, 
                                               
19
 www.labourcourt.ie. Just two hearings were held in 2008. There were no hearings in 2009. 
20
 Some employers participated in multiple hearings (discussed further below). 
21
 See http://www.cso.ie/statistics/LabourForce.htm. 
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“Transport, Storage and Communication”, “Wholesale and Retail”, “Real 
Estate, Renting and Business Activities” (including security services), and 
“Community Social and Personal Service Activities” (excluding health and 
education). When looked at in detail, the cases are almost exclusively taken in 
respect of relatively low-pay, low-skill groups of workers.22  
 
Sixty-four of the employers involved in the hearings (72%) were indigenous 
organisations, while 25 (28%) were Irish subsidiaries of foreign owned MNCs. 
It was not possible in all cases to establish the size of the workforces 
involved. However, of the 76 cases in which this information was ascertained 
in 15 of the cases (20%) the company employed fewer than 20 persons, in 35 
cases (46%) between 20 and 100 persons and in 26 cases (34%) over 100 
persons. Thus, the majority of cases involved relatively large employers, the 
majority of which were indigenous. 
 
Of the 93 hearings where substantive issues were considered (i.e. excluding 
preliminary hearings under s 2(1) of the 2001 Act discussed in the next 
section), binding Determinations under s 6(1) were made in 26 cases (28%). 
In 19 cases the Determination confirmed the original Recommendation in full 
and in seven cases it confirmed the Recommendation in part.23 
                                               
22
 Although there are a limited number of exceptions; the airline pilots in the Ryanair case, for 
example.  
23
 Section 6 specifies that Determinations should be in the same terms as any 
Recommendation made under s 5, unless the Court agrees a variation with the parties, or the 
 11 
 
A random sample of 48 hearings (47% of the total) was chosen for more in-
depth analysis.24 Remuneration25 was at issue in 41 of the hearings. 
Grievance and disciplinary issues were at issue in 30 hearings. Of the latter, 
21 specifically involved the situation where an employee or group of 
employees were seeking to be represented by a trade union representative in 
respect of grievance and/or disciplinary proceedings. Non-pay benefits (e.g. 
canteen facilities) were at issue in 11 cases, leave entitlements in 10, working 
hours and employer failure to comply with statutory obligations both featured 
in six cases with assorted “other” issues featuring in a further 17 cases.26 
Thus, the issues raised involve traditional “core” union issues; pay and 
conditions and protection/representation in respect of grievances and 
disciplinary matters. Very few issues raised related to more “qualitative” 
issues (for example, family-friendly working).  
 
                                                                                                                                       
court decides that the Recommendation, in whole or in part, was grounded on unsound or 
incomplete information. 
24
 Of these, in three cases there was no discussion of the substantive issues, as only the 
Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case was considered. As three of the hearings featuring 
Ashford Castle all involved the same issues, a sample of 43 cases involving distinct 
substantive issues was examined. The sample was random except in the sense that where a 
particular employer was involved in multiple hearings all of these were examined.  
25
 Which here is taken to mean basic salary as well as issues like shift pay, overtime and sick 
pay. 
26
 For example, bullying and harassment, dignity at work; one case of victimisation of the 
grounds of trade union membership was raised. 
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The Ryanair Decision: Procedures 
Confirming Preliminary Jurisdiction  
Under s 2(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 (as 
amended) the Labour Court may investigate a trade dispute where it is 
satisfied that: 
  
“it is not the practice of the employer to engage in collective bargaining 
negotiations in respect of the grade, group or category of workers who 
are party to the trade dispute and the internal dispute resolution 
procedures (if any) normally used by the parties concerned have failed 
to resolve the dispute”. 
 
Under s 3 of the 2001 Act (as amended), any question as to whether the 
requirements specified in s 2 have been met may, as the Court considers 
appropriate, be determined either by way of a hearing preliminary to the 
Court's investigation under that section, or as part of that investigation.  
 
Of the 103 Labour Court hearings held prior to 2008, just 10 were preliminary 
hearings under s 2, where the Court did not discuss the substantive issues 
but considered only its jurisdiction to hear the union’s claim. Of the 10, the 
Court confirmed its jurisdiction in six cases and found it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case in the remaining four cases. 
 
Of the 48 cases chosen for closer analysis, the employer made arguments 
contesting the Labour Court’s jurisdiction to hear the claim in 20 cases. In four 
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cases, the employer made submissions questioning the union’s claim to 
represent employees, in six cases the company argued that internal 
procedures had not been exhausted, in three cases the employer argued that 
no trade dispute existed, in four cases the employer argued that it did, in fact, 
engage in collective bargaining with the relevant workers, in two cases the 
company argued that it engaged in collective bargaining with a different union 
to that taking the claim, and in one case the company claimed the union had 
engaged in industrial action (in breach of the Acts).  
 
Overall, in the sample of 48 cases, the Court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear 
claims in 42 (including three preliminary hearings). In the six cases where the 
Court decided it did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim, it found in three 
cases that the employer did engage in collective bargaining, but with a union 
other than that taking the claim.27 In three further cases, the Court found that 
internal procedures had not been exhausted.28  
 
In Ryanair the Supreme Court was critical of the Labour Court in respect of its 
failure to adequately address the issue of preliminary jurisdiction. The small 
number of stand-alone preliminary hearings held demonstrates that, in the 
vast majority of cases where jurisdiction was contested, the issue was 
decided by the Labour Court as part of the substantive investigation. In the 
                                               
27
 Fernley Airport Services (Case LCR18845 issued on 26/2/2007), Federal Security Services 
(Case LCR18621 issued on 4/07/2006) and MCM Security (Case LCR18206 issued on 
26/05/2005). 
28
 See, for example, Banta Global Turnkey (Case DECP041 issued on 13/07/2004). 
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light of Ryanair, it is likely more preliminary hearings will be necessary in 
future cases, as the preliminary examination would need to be more thorough 
and more formal procedures would need to be employed. This, of course, will 
have time and cost implications. Also, given the restrictive interpretations 
given to key elements of s 2 of the 2001 Act in Ryanair (analysed below), it is 
likely more cases would emerge in which jurisdiction was not confirmed. This 
can already be seen in Bell Security.29  
 
Identity of Union Members and Representation 
The Supreme Court in Ryanair held that the Labour Court did not adopt fair 
procedures by permitting complete non-disclosure of the identity of the 
persons on whose behalf the union was purporting to act. This aspect of the 
decision has led to a concern that, fearing victimisation from employers 
displaying a Ryanair-like aversion to trade unions, many employees would be 
likely to be discouraged from pursuing claims under the legislation.30 The 
                                               
29
 Case LCR19188 issued on 11/04/2008 discussed infra at p30. 
30
 This point is particularly pertinent in the light of Geary’s research, which showed that the 
propensity to unionise in non-union workplaces is especially manifest in situations where 
employers offer their support for union representation; the propensity to unionise drops 
markedly in situations where employers are not prepared to support union organisation. See 
Geary, “Employee Voice in the Irish Workplace: Status and Prospect” in Boxall et al (eds), 
Employee Voice in the Anglo-American World (2006). It should be noted that there are anti-
victimisation procedures under the Acts (ss 8 and 9 of the 2004 Act), which have rarely been 
used. 
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issue had arisen before the Labour Court, which decided in Genesis Group31 
that the legislation: 
 
 “does not require a trade union or excepted body to disclose the 
names or other identifying details of its members as a condition 
precedent to the making of an application”. 
 
The Supreme Court, however, seemed to view the issue of disclosure as a 
fundamental aspect of fair procedures. It is interesting that, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Ryanair decision, the LRC issued a press release, stating 
that, in its view, the verification of union members at the LRC stage of the 
process (at the request of employers) was in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s ruling: 
 
“this was done in a very straightforward way by the Advisory Officer 
obtaining a list of members from the trade union and cross checking 
this against the employer’s own data such as payroll…our advice is 
that, while we must satisfy ourselves that the trade union has members 
in the employment concerned, the judgement does not oblige us to 
compel a trade union to disclose to employers the names of those 
taken into membership”.32 
 
                                               
31
 Case DIR0511 issued on 22/9/2005. 
32
 http://www.lrc.ie/viewdoc.asp?Docid=555&Catid=28&StartDate=1+January+2008&m=n. 
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A related area of controversy is the extent to which unions taking claims under 
the legislation are, in fact, representative. In 78 of the 103 hearings (76%) no 
information can be gleaned from the Labour Court report as to the number of 
members the union in question claimed to have in membership. In the other 
24 cases, the number of members claimed varies significantly. In Castle T 
Furniture,33 for example, SIPTU (Services Industrial Professional & Technical 
Union) claimed to represent half of the 18 employees in the company, while in 
Schering Plough34 the union claimed to represent 306 of the 700 employees 
at the company plant. At the other end of the scale, in QK Cold Stores35 the 
union’s claim was on behalf of just seven employees out of a workforce of 
over 100, while in Finlay Breton36  BATU’s (Building & Allied Trade Union) 
claim was in respect of three members out of a workforce of 300. Thus, in 
some cases the unions involved pursued a claim where they declared to have 
a considerable existing presence, while in others claims were taken on behalf 
of a handful of employees only.  
 
In three of the 48 cases chosen for closer analysis the employer explicitly 
challenged, before the Labour Court, how representative the unions in 
question were.37  In Goode Concrete38 the company contended that the union 
                                               
33
 Case LCR19002 issued on 01/10/2007. 
34
 Case LCR18226 issued on 15/06/2005. 
35
 Case LCR18556 issued on 10/05/2006. 
36
 Case LCR 062 issued on 6/04/2006. 
37
 Hillview Nursing Home (Case LCR 18271 issued on 29/07/2005); Analog Devices (Case 
LCR18137 issued on 21/03/2005); and Goode Concrete (Case LCR18037 issued on 
09/12/2004). 
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was not actually representative of any of its employees and that there could 
not, therefore, be a dispute between it and the union. The union claimed to 
represent 30 drivers and offered to provide the Court, on a confidential basis, 
with details concerning the number and identity of company employees who 
had joined the union, as the members did not consent to their identity being 
disclosed to their employer for reasons outlined to the Court. The Court noted 
that the Acts do not prescribe any membership threshold which a trade union 
must meet before it can bring an application under s 2(1) and accepted the 
assurances of the union that it was representative of employees in dispute 
with the company. 
 
The issue of verifying to what extent a union is representative of workers in 
dispute is now paramount in the light of Ryanair. Unions are, and have been, 
reluctant to publicly divulge information about membership levels in non-union 
companies for fear this may lead to employees being identified by employers 
and, potentially, being victimised or disadvantaged. The Supreme Court 
decision goes beyond this by explicitly requiring some identification of 
individual employees in dispute. This is so even though, as the Labour Court 
has pointed out, there is no requirement under the legislation for unions to 
meet any representation threshold prior to taking a claim.39  
                                                                                                                                       
38
 Ibid. 
39
 This idea of pressure on unions to disclose to courts and tribunals sensitive information 
regarding membership has interesting parallels with the view posited by some that the result 
of the ECJ’s decisions in cases like Viking could well be that unions, in order to defend the 
proportionality of industrial action in claims relating to EU free movement rights, could be 
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This is a real problem for unions, not only as many (most?) members will 
likely be unwilling to put their heads above the parapet in pursuing a claim 
under the legislation, but also more broadly in the sense that evidence has 
shown that, in the absence of employer support, many Irish workers are 
fearful of the consequences of joining unions at all lest union membership 
damage their career prospects.40 In this sense, there may be some conflict 
between the position following the Supreme Court decision and Ireland’s 
obligations under Article 11 of the ECHR. It should be remembered that in the 
Wilson and Palmer case41 the European Court of Human Rights found that 
“employees should be free to instruct or permit their union to make 
representations to their employer or to take action in support of their 
interests”.42 The Court went on to say that if workers were prevented from so 
doing, their freedom to belong to a trade union became illusory and that it was 
the “role of the State to ensure that trade union members were not prevented 
                                                                                                                                       
forced to disclose to national courts and tribunals potentially oppressive volumes of materials 
on internal union strategy, tactics and policy; see Ewing and Hendy, “The ECJ Decisions and 
Trade Union Freedom: Lessons from the UK” in Ewing and Hendy (eds), The New Spectre 
Haunting Europe-The ECJ, Trade Union Rights and the British Government (2009). Case C-
438/05 International Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union v Viking 
Line ABP [2008] IRLR 14. See further infra p38. 
40
 Geary, supra, note 30. 
41
 Wilson & the NUJ, Palmer, & Others v The UK [2002] IRLR 128. 
42
 Ibid, at para 46 (emphasis added). 
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or restrained from using their union to represent them in attempts to regulate 
their relations with their employers”.43 
 
In relation to the issue of identifiable union members giving evidence, one 
solution might be for some number of employees, on whose behalf the union 
is acting, to swear affidavits, which would be supplied to the Labour Court. 
The Court, having verified that the employees are union members and work 
for the company (in a manner similar to that outlined by the LRC above), 
could then supply anonymous versions of these to the employer. This, 
however, would run into another procedural issue identified by the Supreme 
Court that relates to oral evidence (discussed in the next section).  
 
A second way out of the identification issue might be to re-fashion s 2(1) 
altogether. Instead of fulfilling the criteria presently laid down in order to take a 
claim, a union could be required to meet some specified threshold of 
membership (which, again, could be verified by the LRC or Labour Court). 
This would have the advantage for employers of their not being subject to the 
legislation where only a handful of workers are union members.44 There is 
some recent precedence for this type of arrangement, too, in the Employee 
(Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006, which requires 
employers to inform and consult with employee representatives on a range of 
                                               
43
 Ibid. 
44
 As in Finlay Breton, supra, note 36. 
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issues, where such a request is made by at least 10% of the workforce.45 For 
the unions, where such a threshold was met, this approach would give “moral 
legitimacy” to their claims. This, in fact, would not be a million miles from the 
position pre-2001, where unions took recognition claims under s 20(1) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1969. Recommendations under the 1969 Act that the 
employer should recognise the union in respect of those workers it had in 
membership, were not binding on the employer and were often ignored.46 
However, such a Recommendation still allowed a union taking industrial 
action in support of recognition to show that it had done its best to abide by 
procedures. Under the 2001-2004 Acts, of course, any Recommendation 
would not relate to union recognition, but would be binding.  
 
Whether this would satisfy the unions is another question. As noted, the 
unions may have seen the legislation as a potential “springboard” to full 
recognition rights in companies. To meet a threshold unions would need to 
build up substantial support in a company prior to making a claim (a problem 
that has bedevilled British unions attempting to invoke the statutory 
recognition procedure there),47 whereas, under the present s 2(1) they can 
invoke the legislation on behalf of any number of members, however small. 
Success can then result in a beneficial “demonstration” effect to other 
                                               
45
 The 2006 Act implements Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March 2002 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community OJ L80/29; 
see Doherty, “It's Good to Talk...Isn't It? Legislating for Information and Consultation in the 
Irish Workplace” (2008) 15 DULJ 120. 
46
 Higgins, “The Right to Bargain Law: Is it Working?” (2001) 45 IRN. 
47
 See, further, infra p45. 
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employees and help unions to garner more members. Similarly, from an 
employee’s point of view, the purpose of the legislation, as outlined by 
Geoghegan J in Ryanair, was to protect employees in non-unionised 
companies from the obvious danger that: 
 
“employees may be exploited and may have to submit to what most 
reasonable people would consider to be grossly unfair terms and 
conditions of employment”.48 
 
One of the objectives of the Acts was to permit a right to representation for 
individual union members in the face of their employer’s opposition. As such 
employees, as individuals, normally have little bargaining power, the Acts 
accorded with arguably the main object of labour law; to be a countervailing 
force to counteract the inequality of bargaining inherent in the relationship, 
concealed by that “indispensable figment of the legal mind, the contract of 
employment”. 49  
 
Oral Evidence  
A final procedural issue raised by the Supreme Court related to oral evidence. 
The Court felt that factual issues in dispute should be resolved on oral 
evidence from parties who participated in the process or who could give first 
                                               
48
 At p215. 
49
 Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (1977), p6. 
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hand evidence on how the employer’s procedures operated.50 Therefore, 
direct evidence on any issue is generally to be preferred to a legal 
submission, or an opinion or references to documents unsupported by direct 
evidence. 
 
The reference here to an “opinion” is particularly worrying for the unions, as it 
relates to the issues discussed in the previous section around employees 
giving direct evidence. In order to protect employees’ anonymity, the usual 
practice under the Acts has been for a union official to outline the employee 
case. Indeed, of the sample of 48 cases looked at here, in only one did an 
employee who was party to the dispute appear to give oral evidence.51 If 
direct evidence from those involved is to be preferred, this option will be no 
longer enough. It is interesting to note in Ryanair that Hanna J, in the High 
Court,52 pointed out that whether or not oral evidence is offered in a case is a 
call made on a daily basis by advocates before the ordinary courts, where 
parties are free to offer viva voce evidence or not as the case may be. He 
went on to observe that, while there might be circumstances in which the 
Labour Court might take a more “activist role” in determining what oral 
evidence it might wish to hear (for example, where there is a marked 
imbalance of "fire power" in the representation of the parties before it) this 
was not such a case. 
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The Supreme Court Decision: Interpretation 
The second limb of the Supreme Court’s criticism in Ryanair related to the 
interpretation given key elements of the amended s 2(1) of the 2001 Act by 
the Labour Court. For the Labour Court to assert jurisdiction in such cases it 
must be satisfied that it is not the “practice of the employer to engage in 
collective bargaining” with a trade union or an excepted body.  The view 
accepted by the Labour Court was that if a group of employees unilaterally 
withdraws from the internal negotiating procedures, it could not thereafter be 
said that the employer had a practice of engaging in collective bargaining with 
them. The Labour Court laid down its definition of collective bargaining in the 
Ashford Castle53 case, noting that the expression is not defined in industrial 
relations legislation and that it is not a legal term of art: 
 
“Collective bargaining comprehends more than mere negotiation or 
consultation on individual employment related issues, including the 
processes of individual grievances in relation to pay or conditions of 
employment. In the industrial relations context in which the term is 
commonly used, it connotes a process by which employers or their 
representatives negotiate with representatives of a group or body of 
workers for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement fixing the 
pay and other conditions of employment applicable to the group of 
workers on whose behalf the negotiations are conducted.  
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Normally the process is characterised by the involvement of a trade 
union representing workers, but it may also be conducted by a staff 
association, which is an excepted body within the meaning of the Trade 
Union Act 1941, as amended. However an essential characteristic of 
collective bargaining, properly so called, is that it is conducted between 
parties of equal standing, who are independent in the sense that one is 
not controlled by the other”. 
 
The Supreme Court, however, objected to the view “arguably hinted at” in the 
definition that collective bargaining in a non-unionised company must take the 
same form and adopt the same procedures as would apply in collective 
bargaining with a trade union. The Supreme Court criticised the Labour Court 
for acknowledging a special, trade union meaning of the expression “collective 
bargaining negotiations” and held that the phrase should be given simply an 
ordinary meaning and not any distinctive meaning as understood in trade 
union negotiations. According to Geoghegan J: 
 
“if there is a machinery in Ryanair whereby the pilots may have their 
own independent representatives who sit around the table with 
representatives of Ryanair with a view to reaching agreement, if 
possible, that would seem to be ‘collective bargaining’”.54 
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 At p218. 
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Furthermore, the unilateral withdrawal by employees from machinery put in 
place by the employer would not of itself entitle the employees to assert that 
there was no collective bargaining process in being; ultimately, where an 
employer has an internal non-union collective bargaining unit in place, this 
might constitute an excepted body under the legislation and satisfy the 
requirements of s 2.  
 
The definition of collective bargaining provided by the Supreme Court and its 
indication that a collective bargaining unit can, it seems, amount to any group 
of employees as long as the group is recognised for this purpose by the 
company concerned have provoked much comment. In Ashford Castle v 
SIPTU Clarke J, in the High Court, noted that the legislation: 
 
“only applies in circumstances where there is no collective bargaining. 
The only reasonable inference to draw from that provision is that the 
intention of the Oireachtas was to confer upon employees, who did not 
have the benefit of collective bargaining, a means of attempting to 
achieve terms and conditions comparable to those who had the benefit 
of collective bargaining”.55 
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 [2007] 4 IR 70, at p75. 
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This was also the view underpinning the Labour Court’s approach to the four 
cases examined in this research where the employer argued that it did, in fact, 
engage in collective bargaining.56  
 
In Exel Technologies57 the company claimed that "monthly communications 
meetings" were held to discuss all matters relating to employment, including 
pay and non-pay terms and conditions of employment, and were attended by 
elected staff representatives from each department. Therefore, the employer 
submitted, this process was no different from that which occurs in a company 
that engages with a trade union. SIPTU contended that the monthly 
communications meeting system was under the control of the employer and, 
consequently, employees had no appropriate means of processing claims 
with independent representation, no means of appeal, and no opportunity to 
refer to third parties. The Court was satisfied that no details had been 
submitted by the employer to show that disputes concerning terms and 
conditions of employment were normally or routinely dealt with through this 
process. Consequently, the Court found that the Company's procedure was 
not of the type envisaged by s 2(1)(a) of the Act. 
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 In addition to the examples discussed in the text, see Little Rascal Crèche (Case 
LCR18648 issued on 24/07/2006) and Ashford Castle (Case DECP032 issued on 
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 Case LCR18274 issued on 25/07/2005. 
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In Ryanair58 the company outlined a system (which it contended amounted to 
collective bargaining) whereby employees, including pilots, elect employee 
representatives to Employee Representative Committees (ERCs). The 
various ERCs then negotiate directly with the company on an ongoing basis in 
relation to all terms and conditions of employment. It was accepted that the 
Dublin pilot representatives had withdrawn from the ERC in August 2004 and 
no new representatives had been appointed. The Court found that the ERCs 
were established by Ryanair who organised and controlled the election of 
employee representatives to them, including specifying the criteria of eligibility 
for election (e.g. no representative could serve more than one term). 
Employees were informed of the outcome of ERC discussions by Ryanair in a 
newsletter which it published and in respect of which it retained copyright. As 
a result (and by reference also to company documents) the Labour Court 
found that the collective bargaining did not take place within the company.  
 
The Labour Court will now have to rethink its underlying approach in the light 
of the Supreme Court decision. While the latter, significantly, did not set down 
precise rules or offer guidelines for the operation of a non-union internal 
bargaining unit, it seems from the judgment that employers would be free to 
determine the form, structure and organisation of any internal collective 
bargaining units, as long as these have a degree of permanency and are not 
ad hoc. Thus, if an employer were to set up such a unit, it could presumably 
decide on issues such as how employees would be elected or chosen to be 
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members, the remit of the unit, the terms of office of its members, and the 
rules and procedures of its operation.59  
 
Disquiet has been expressed that the Supreme Court’s definition of collective 
bargaining tends to ignore not only Ireland’s industrial relations traditions, but 
also ILO Conventions and Declarations to which Ireland is a signatory.60 
Ireland has ratified a number of ILO instruments, which explicitly require that 
the framework within which collective bargaining must take place if it is to be 
viable and effective be based on the principles of the independence and 
autonomy of the parties and the free and voluntary nature of the 
negotiations.61 Furthermore, ILO principles require that all legislation 
establishing machinery and procedures for arbitration and conciliation 
designed to facilitate bargaining between both sides of industry should 
guarantee the autonomy of parties to collective bargaining; explicitly excluded 
is the notion of employer dominated bodies or company unions being 
considered as mechanisms for collective bargaining.62  
 
Moreover, in addition to its international law obligations, there must be a real 
concern as to the compatibility of the Irish position with Article 28 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees the “right to negotiate and 
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conclude collective agreements”. If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified by all Member 
States, the Charter will attain the status of primary EU law.63 The provisions of 
the Charter, according to Title VII, are addressed to the institutions and bodies 
of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. However, there 
is an obligation on Community Institutions and Member States to promote the 
rights in the Charter. Finally, given that Ireland has now incorporated into 
domestic law the ECHR64 there is an obligation on the Irish Courts to interpret 
and apply any statutory provision or rule of law in a manner that is compatible 
with the country’s obligations under the Convention.65 In this respect, it is 
important to note the recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Demir and Baykara v Turkey66 where the Court declared that Article 11 of 
the ECHR includes a right to collectively bargain and precludes a blanket ban 
on a right to strike.67 
 
There must be a real concern, therefore, that the Supreme Court, by not 
indicating more precisely what a non-union internal bargaining unit would look 
like, opens the possibility that employers will set up units that may not be 
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genuine bargaining fora and thus abuse the process. At the very least, it 
seems, legislative intervention will be required.68 Most likely this will require a 
statutory definition of “collective bargaining”. The ILO defines collective 
bargaining as: 
 
 “all negotiations which take place between an employer, a group of 
employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, 
and one or more workers' organisations, on the other, for- 
(a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or 
(b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or 
(c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and a 
workers' organisation or workers' organisations”. 69 
 
Where national law or practice recognises the existence of other forms of 
workers’ representatives, national law or practice can determine the extent to 
which the term collective bargaining shall also extend to negotiations with 
these representatives.70 Thus, although ILO definitions emphasise the role of 
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trade unions in collective bargaining, they do recognise the potential role of 
non-union representatives. Crucially, however, they also insist that such 
representatives (and bargaining units) must be genuinely independent of 
employers. It can be argued that worker representatives (whether elected or 
appointed) who are employees of the undertaking, and therefore dependent 
on the goodwill of management for their employment and prospects of 
promotion, can never be genuinely independent.71 However, at a minimum, 
Irish legislation could be amended to, first, lay down conditions to be met 
regarding the establishment and operation of internal non-union bargaining 
units.72 Secondly, and in contrast to the Supreme Court’s view, it might be 
provided that collective bargaining could not take place in a context where an 
employer refuses to engage with the trade union or excepted body which 
employees indicate (by way, perhaps, of ballot or independent verification) 
they wish to represent them. 
 
The effects of the Supreme Court’s decision can already be clearly seen. 
First, as noted above, the number of claims pursued under the Act has 
dropped dramatically and many union officials have proclaimed the acts 
effectively dead. Secondly, the decision in Bell Security73 illustrates the new 
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approach taken by the Labour Court. Here, two employees gave oral 
evidence to the court in support of the union’s claim (both were union shop 
stewards). The Labour Court found that a trade dispute was in existence. It 
further found that the internal dispute resolution procedures had been 
exhausted. However, on the facts of the case the Court decided that it was 
the company’s practice to engage in collective bargaining with employees. 
The Labour Court’s concluding remarks are worth quoting at this point: 
 
“The Court accepts the union’s submission that on the facts of this 
case there was an inherent and manifest inequality of negotiating 
capacity between the employee and management representatives. A 
professional HR specialist and senior managers represented the 
Company. Electricians who had no training or skills in negotiation or 
bargaining represented the employees. It is clear on the evidence that 
because of this the employee representatives came to see their role as 
involving little more than carrying messages back and forth and 
considered the process to be a waste of time and going nowhere.  
 
It is nonetheless clear on the evidence that there was a practice 
whereby representatives of the employees, including representatives of 
the Dublin engineers, sat around a table with representatives of the 
Company with a view to reaching agreement if possible. That is 
collective bargaining negotiations for the purpose of the Act.  
 
If the Court were considering the factual matrix of this case in an 
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industrial relations context it might take a different view. However it 
must apply the law as it finds it and following the decision in Ryanair 
they can be no doubt as to the correct legal approach to the questions 
arising in this case”. 
 
Thus, the Court accepted that the Supreme Court decision requires it to take 
an approach outside of the “industrial relations context”. Of course, the court’s 
unease with this, as well as its comments on the inequality of fire-power 
between the parties, should be noted with concern. However, it does seem 
that it is the definition of “collective bargaining” that is key here. The union 
quoted both ILO and dictionary definitions. Legislative movement on this issue 
in line with these may well, therefore, have the effect of resuscitating the Acts.  
 
An “Irish Model” for Representation Rights? 
The study did not seek to investigate in-depth the extent to which union claims 
were (un/)successful under the legislation. However, a number of points are 
noteworthy in terms of the Recommendations made by the Labour Court. This 
section will assess some of the key impacts of the legislation, focussing 
particularly on the extent to which the acts plugged the “representation gap” 
that exists where employers refuse to recognise employees’ union(s). 
Moreover, potential implications of this “Irish model” for IR practice elsewhere 
are considered. 
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Mandating the “Model Employer”-An Irish Approach to the 
“Laval Question”? 
In 34 of the 48 cases looked at in-depth, the Labour Court made a 
Recommendation on remuneration. Two types of Recommendation are 
noteworthy. First, in eight of the cases, the Court felt the company should pay 
the terms of the national pay agreement in place at the time. For example, in 
Creagh Transport74 it was established that the company had no fixed or 
formal system of reviewing the pay of its employees. The company claimed 
that, due to the economic and commercial circumstances of the business, it 
had been unable to pay any increases for over four years. The Labour Court 
was of the view that the company’s failure to provide for any increases in pay 
over such an extended period could not be justified. The Court went on to say 
that whilst the increases provided by national partnership agreements were 
not an automatic statutory or contractual entitlement, in the absence of any 
other established or agreed method of pay determination, they represented an 
“appropriate reference point” for establishing a fair and reasonable level of 
pay adjustment. The Court rejected the submission it was precluded from 
recommending increases in line with those provided by national agreements 
as any recommendation made by the Court to that effect could be 
implemented without the necessity for collective bargaining at the level of the 
enterprise. The Court recommended that in future, pay should be adjusted by 
reference to the increases provided by national agreements subject to the 
right of the company to plead inability to pay through the mechanisms 
provided by those agreements. 
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Secondly, in 18 cases where a Recommendation on remuneration was made, 
this was on the basis of pay norms in the given industry.75 In Bank of Ireland76 
the Court pointed out:  
 
“The powers which are given to the Court by the Act are a far reaching 
departure from the normal approach to the resolution of industrial 
relations disputes. They provided, in effect, that the Court may arbitrate 
in a dispute on the unilateral application of one party and in 
circumstances where the other party may not consent to the process. It 
seems to the Court that, having regard to the voluntary nature of our 
industrial relations system, such an intervention is only appropriate 
where it is necessary in order to provide protection to workers whose 
terms and conditions of employment, when viewed in their totality, are 
significantly out of line with appropriate standards”. 
 
Thus, the Court, in its Recommendations on pay, has sought to introduce the 
idea of the “model employer”; in other words, it has effectively benchmarked 
respondent companies against others in the sector. This can be seen in 
Fournier Laboratories,77 where the Court found that the company's pay 
determination system was out of line with accepted standards in that it was 
based solely on performance-assessment, rather than by reference to a basic 
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“rate for the job”, the predominant practice in the sector. Similarly, in Cooley 
Distillery78 the Court accepted pay rates agreed by the union (through 
collective bargaining) with other employments both locally and nationally as 
indicative of the industry norm. It recommended the respondent increase its 
pay rates to this more “appropriate standard”. 79  
 
Therefore, where companies fall below the general, prevailing industry 
standards (as located by the Court) they have been told to raise standards to 
that level (frequently identified as those set down by national pay 
agreements). From an employer’s point of view, this can be seen as 
unwarranted interference with the right to operate a business and with 
property rights (as it effectively forces up industry norms in terms of pay). 
Furthermore, using the “unionised” standard of national agreements seems to 
threaten the right (recognised in Ryanair) to operate a non-union company. 
This most likely feeds in to the Supreme Court’s criticism of the Labour 
Court’s “union mindset”.  
 
However, it has been frequently suggested (although evidence is somewhat 
sketchy)80 that in many industries the national agreements do act as a 
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benchmark for non-union firms. In addition, in pay claims before the Labour 
Court under any legislation, the national agreements are arguably a useful 
benchmark to use. The alternative is for the Court to depend on the parties’ 
submissions on local and sectoral pay comparators. In such cases, both sides 
will have clear agendas, which can distort the true picture, information of this 
nature may be difficult to obtain and partial, and there are concerns about 
confidentiality. Furthermore, intervention in companies’ wage-setting is 
nothing new; all employers are bound by the national minimum wage and 
some industries are subject to levels of pay set by Joint Industrial Councils 
(JICs) and Joint Labour Committees (JLCs).81 Clearly, though, there is a 
distinction between legal binding minimum standards and the setting of an 
industry wide “fair rate for the job” (particularly where the latter is set, not by 
the parties themselves in collective agreements, but by a State industrial 
relations tribunal). 
 
It this issue of binding minimum standards, as distinct from collectively agreed 
norms, that has been at the heart of controversial recent European Court of 
                                               
81
 See Parts IV and V Industrial Relations Act 1946. JLCs provide for the fixing of legally 
binding minimum rates of pay and the regulation of employment in certain sectors where 
there is little or no collective bargaining and where significant numbers of vulnerable workers 
are employed (e.g. the Hotels sector). Collective agreements made by JICs (voluntary 
negotiating bodies for an industry or part of an industry, designed to facilitate collective 
bargaining at industry level in certain sectors) are also registered with the Labour Court and 
are legally binding. They generally exist in sectors with a relatively high level of unionisation 
(e.g. the Construction sector). The Industrial Relations Amendment Bill 2009 (just published 
at the time of writing) seeks to strengthen both mechanisms. 
 38 
Justice decisions on collective rights. In a series of cases, Laval, Viking, 
Rüffert and Luxembourg,82 the ECJ has severely affected the rights of trade 
unions and Member States to protect collective agreements in cases where 
the rights of free movement of services or establishment are involved. The 
Court ruled in Laval that, in accordance with the free movement of services 
provisions of the EC Treaty and the terms of the Posted Workers Directive 
(PWD),83 Swedish trade unions could not take industrial action to compel a 
Latvian builder operating in Stockholm, and “posting” Latvian workers there, to 
observe the terms and conditions of collective agreements operating in 
Sweden. Similarly, in Rüffert a Polish contractor could not be compelled to 
observe collective agreements that were locally, but not nationally, applicable 
and in Luxembourg posting employers could not be forced to observe 
collectively agreed minimum terms and conditions of employment beyond the 
mandatory matters listed in Article 3 of the PWD. At the heart of all these 
rulings is the view that where collective agreements are not declared 
universally applicable, extended erga omnes to non-union workplaces, or their 
provisions protected, in some way, by Member State legislation, they cannot 
be imposed on service providers from other EU jurisdictions operating in the 
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Member State in question.84 All that can be required of such service providers 
is that they observe statutory minima terms and conditions of employment.  
 
In this respect, the Irish legislation, ironically given that it falls short of union 
demands for strengthened collective bargaining rights, might offer a 
mechanism to protect “prevailing rates”, rather than minimum standards, that 
would withstand ECJ scrutiny. In terms of fairness and social equity, the 
Labour Court approach, in attempting to benchmark and mandate good 
practice, has much to commend it. The Court, after all, is explicitly set up to 
reflect and accommodate the different, often conflicting, interests of labour 
and business in the interest of employment relations harmony. However, it 
has been persuasively argued85 that the Irish judiciary in a number of major 
areas of constitutional interpretation frequently tends to defer to individual 
values, and particularly individual property rights, over those of the community 
or collective groups. This approach of the Superior Courts is, perhaps, visible 
again in the Ryanair decision. It would require a legislative (or Supreme 
Court) rethinking of what “bargaining” entails in the Irish context (in line with 
ILO and ECHR formulations) for the Acts to truly offer a way out of the “Laval” 
dilemma. We will return to this question in the concluding section. 
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A Trojan Horse? Union Recognition Under the Acts 
A key concern of employers has been that the Acts effectively promote a form 
of “back door” union recognition; that essentially the Acts allow unions to get 
their “foot in the door” and force employers to deal with them on some level.86 
Undoubtedly, the unions hoped that this would be the case. It should be 
noted, however, that in only two cases, Federal Security Services Ltd87 and 
Hillview Nursing Home88 did employers actually concede bargaining 
recognition to a union (and in both cases, the employer decided to recognise 
unions other than those taking the respective claims). Therefore, neither the 
fears of employers nor the hopes of the unions seem to be borne out 
empirically.  
 
Nevertheless, the Acts have had some interesting effects worthy of comment. 
In a limited number of rulings, the Labour Court seemed to indicate that, on 
certain issues, unions and their members should have a collective influence. 
This can be seen in Carlingford Nursing Home89 where it was recommended 
that the company put in place a new harassment and equal treatment policy. 
In drawing this up, the union (SIPTU) was to be permitted to make 
submissions on the content of such policies and these submissions were to 
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be taken into account. More starkly, perhaps, in the long running saga 
involving Ashford Castle90 the company (while not conceding union 
recognition) eventually indicated to the Court that it would be prepared to 
facilitate the union in providing paid training for its shop stewards, who could 
then represent members in grievance procedures.  
 
Most worryingly of all for non-union employers is the case of Esker Lodge 
nursing home, where it was reported that the Irish Business and Employers’ 
Confederation (IBEC) may have advised the company to recognise the union 
on pragmatic grounds; that is, that it would be easier to simply concede 
recognition than to become caught up in the procedure under the Acts. 91 It 
should be stressed, though, that there seems little further evidence of cases 
where unions have been able to use the spectre of the Acts to persuade 
employers to engage directly in a traditional collective bargaining relationship. 
 
In this respect, the Acts throw up an intriguing dilemma for unions. Taking 
claims under the Acts involves considerable time and expense. Often claims 
are taken on behalf of non-members, and frequently in respect of small 
groups of workers. Although unions may have been willing to pursue these 
claims initially in an attempt to demonstrate the value of union representation 
to non-union workforces, the sustainability of such a strategy is questionable. 
It certainly is not a traditional form of union representation nor does it fit within 
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many of the prescriptions offered to halt union decline in the literature on 
union “revitalisation”.92  
 
Furthermore, the fact that the legislation explicitly excludes Recommendations 
on collective bargaining and empowers the Court to deal only with specific, 
defined issues, means that unions may face the prospect of being forced to 
take multiple claims against a particular employer. The study showed that 89 
different employers featured in the 103 hearings, but some employers 
featured in multiple hearings; Ashford Castle, for example, was involved in 
four separate hearings.93 Again, this type of action probably involves an 
unsustainable commitment of union time and resources. Clearly, the unions 
will take such cases in order to try and persuade employers to recognise them 
in a traditional bargaining relationship. Where employers refuse, however, 
multiple claims seem to be the only option under the legislation. Outside of the 
impacts on unions and employers (who will have the threat of Labour Court 
imposed pay and conditions hanging over them) there are important public 
policy considerations here also, not least the implications in terms of the 
growing demands on the time and resources of the LRC and the Labour 
Court. 
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A final issue needs to be addressed here in relation to union recognition. As 
noted above, one of the key objections to any attempts to introduce a 
statutory recognition procedure (along the lines of the UK) has been the 
alleged threat this would pose to foreign direct investment (primarily from US 
MNCs) on which the Irish economy is so dependent. Similar concerns have 
been voiced about the impact of the 2001-2004 Acts on MNC activity in 
Ireland.94 In this regard, it should be noted that the study reveals the majority 
of cases involved indigenous employers (72%). Although the number of cases 
involving MNCs is perhaps higher than had been previously thought,95 the 
main impact of the legislation, as we have seen, has been on employers 
whose pay and conditions fall below the industry norm. The larger, “flagship” 
MNCs, where HR practices would generally be relatively sophisticated and 
where pay and conditions of employment would generally be at the higher end 
of the spectrum, barely feature at all.96 Thus, the focus on the “threat to 
investment” argument seems to be misplaced.  
 
Conclusion 
This article considered the operation of the 2001-2004 right to bargain 
legislation in the light of the seminal Supreme Court decision in the Ryanair 
                                               
94
 Supra, note 6. 
95
 Sheehan, supra, note 15. 
96
 And, for example, in GE Healthcare (Case LCR18013 issued on 22/11/2004) SIPTU’s pay 
claim was rejected by the Court as employees had actually received pay increases in excess 
of the national pay deals.   
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case. Throughout, the concern was to identify, first, whether the legislation 
has any future role to play and, secondly, to consider the impacts of the Acts 
and the Ryanair decision on the various IR stakeholders for whom the rights 
(or lack thereof) to union representation is of paramount concern. On the first 
issue, various suggestions were made that could have the effect of 
“resuscitating” the legislation, in particular a re-formulation of the definition of 
“collective bargaining”.97 On the second issue, there must be a real concern 
that Irish law remains unique in the Western world in not offering legally 
guaranteed rights to union representation.  
 
However, the innovative nature of the legislation is worthy of some concluding 
comments in the light of recent developments in other EU jurisdictions. First, it 
has been noted that the UK, with a similar voluntarist tradition to Ireland 
(albeit without the corporatist tendencies evident in the social partnership era), 
introduced a mandatory union recognition law under the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act. The legislation has certainly not been an unqualified success 
from the point of view of bolstering collective bargaining there, as, while there 
has been a sharp decline in the de-recognition of unions, concerns have been 
expressed that recognition has been primarily achieved in “core” union 
constituencies (where existing membership levels are relatively high); that the 
scope of collective bargaining is relatively restricted and often more 
represents consultative, rather than joint, regulation, and that the delays and 
                                               
97
 See also Gilvarry and Hunt, “Trade Union Recognition and the Labour Court: Picking Up 
the Pieces after Ryanair” in Hastings (ed), The State of the Unions (2008). 
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costs of organising recognition ballots frustrate efforts to recruit and retain 
members.98 Recognition laws, clearly, are not a panacea for union ills.99 
 
Secondly, we have discussed above the impact of recent ECJ decisions 
regarding the interaction between economic rights and the right to uphold 
collective agreements. The ECJ has effectively made voluntary collective 
agreements that require service providers to comply with terms and conditions 
that go beyond statutory minima impossible to enforce against providers from 
other EU jurisdictions. The Irish legislation and the Labour Court’s operation 
thereof, at least before its emasculation in the Ryanair case, did provide an 
opportunity for prevailing norms in an industry or (through voluntary national 
pay deals) the economy as a whole to be enforced, even where these 
exceeded statutory minimum standards. Where legal protection for collective 
bargaining rights under EU law appears to be under threat, it may be that the 
Irish approach offers an alternative model worthy of exploration.  
                                               
98
 See, for example, Dukes, “The Statutory Recognition Procedure 1999: No Bias in Favour of 
Recognition?” (2008) 37(2) Ind Law J 236; Brown and Nash, “What Has Been Happening to 
Collective Bargaining Under New Labour? Interpreting WERS 2004” (2008) 39(2) Industrial 
Relations Journal 91; McArthur, “The Efficacy of Statutory Union Recognition Under New 
Labour: A Comparative Review” (2004) 20(3) International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations 399; and Oxenbridge et al, “Initial Responses to the Statutory 
Recognition Provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999” (2003) 41(2) British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 315. 
99
 As Kahn-Freund put it “‘a healthy union movement can take a great deal of legal 
intervention whilst weak unions may be its victim”; op. cit, p121. 
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